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EFFECTIVE USE OF DISCLAIMERS
FRUSTRATING THE PLANNER AND FEDERAL TAX POLICY
WILLIAM SCHWARTZ *
I. INTRODUCTION
A disclaimer has been defined as "a refusal to accept the ownership of
property or rights with respect to property."' Although it operates after a
transfer has been made and thus is not useful as a pre-transfer estate plan-
ning device, the disclaimer may play an important estate planning role.
The disclaimer can be useful as a technique for adjusting an estate plan to
account for circumstances which were unforeseen at the time of the formu-
lation of the plan. In addition, to the extent that the disclaimer results in
post-transfer-date changes being treated for transfer tax purposes as
though they were incorporated in the original plan, the premium on skill-
ful advance planning is lessened. 2
Despite the utility of the disclaimer, its use was severely restricted
prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Until that time, the
tax laws did not provide either definitive rules as to what constitutes a "dis-
claimer" or rules of general application concerning the tax consequences of
a disclaimer. 3 Prior to the 1976 Act, the tax consequences resulting from
certain disclaimers were prescribed, on an ad hoc basis, only under several,
individual code sections. Under the provisions relating to the estate tax
charitable' and marital 5 deductions, property was deemed to pass from the
decedent to the person who receives it by reason of the disclaimer. Under
the section dealing with powers of appointment, a disclaimer of a general
power was not treated as a release of the power and, therefore, was not a
taxable event.° Under the gift tax regulations, a disclaimer had to be effec-
tive under local law in order to avoid the imposition of gift tax liability on
the disclaimant. 7
Because of the lack of federal rules of general applicability, the fed-
eral tax consequences of a disclaimer generally depended upon its treat-
ment under local law.° The resolution of the issue of whether the dis-
claimer was a taxable transfer hinged, in many instances, upon whether the
disclaimant was considered to have held title to the property under local
law prior to his disclaimer.° If he was deemed to have been vested with ti-
*Professor or Law, Boston University School of Law. A.M., Boston University, 1960; j.D.,
Boston University, 1955. Author of FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING (1977 Supp.).
' H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE Cow. &
An, NEWS 2897, 3419.
2 ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIVE TAX PROJECT, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION AND RECOMMENDATIoN IN REFERENCE TIIERETO 39 (1969).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Al). NEWS 2897, 3420.
I.R.C.4 	§ 2055(a) (1976) (prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 [hereinafter the 1976 Act]).
5 I.R.C. § 2056(d) (1976) (prior to amendment by the 1976 Act).
I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), 2514(b) (1976) (prior to amendment by the 1976 Act).
'Treas. Reg. § 2511-1(c) (1958).
H.R. REP. No.94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2897, 3421. Set Treas. Reg. § 25.2511(c) (1958).
9 See, e.g., Hardenberg v. Commission, 198 F.2d 63, 66 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952); Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914, 916 (6th Cir. 1933).
In Hardenberg, for example, a disclaimer of intestate property was subjected to gift and
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tle, the disclaimer would be a taxable event. However, state laws were not
and are not uniform. As a consequence, identical refusals to accept prop-
erty by disclaimants in different states were treated differently for federal
estate and gift tax purposes.'° These local technicalities were irrelevant to
the federal tax policy questions involved."
The problems emanating from this federal tax deference to local law
were compounded, in some instances, by the lack of specificity in this area
of the law. The status of the common law of disclaimers has been charac-
terized as "spotty." Unfortunately, not all states have enacted disclaimer leg-
islation which fills in the gaps in the law."
In addition, for many of the estate and gift tax provisions, no specific
time period was prescribed within which a disclaimer had to be made.
While disclaimers affecting the charitable' 3
 and marital" deductions had to
be made before the due date for filing the estate tax return, for other tax
purposes the existing state and federal law concerning the time within
which a disclaimer had to be made was unclear. In one case, a remainder-
man, who was aware of his interest, was deemed to have effectively dis-
claimed his remainder interest for gift tax purposes when he disclaimed
shortly after the expiration of a life tenancy which had continued for nine-
teen years after the grantor's death. 15 This result was reached in the face of
a federal regulation which required that a disclaimer be made within a rea-
sonable time after the beneficiary has knowledge of the existence of the
transfer," since under local law, the court held, the reasonable time was
measured from the time of vesting rather than the time of creation of the
interest. This decision dramatizes the significance of local law and the re-
sulting possible unevenness of tax treatment for residents of different
states.
In response to this situation, Congress enacted section 2518 into the
Internal Revenue Code as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Congress'
objective was expressed as follows in the House Report:
Your committee believes that definitive rules concerning
disclaimers should be provided for estate and gift tax purposes
to achieve uniform treatment. In addition, your committee be-
lieves that a uniform standard should be provided for determin-
ing the time within which a disclaimer must be made.
The bill provides definitive rules relating to disclaimers for
purposes of the estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer
taxes. If the requirements of the provisions are satisfied, a re-
fusal to accept property is to be given effect for federal estate
estate taxes since title vested in the heir at the decedent's death. On the other hand, a contrary
result was reached in Brown with respect to property passing by will. State law is not uniform
on these subjects.
"See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 11976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An.NEws 2897, 3421.
" See American Bar Association, Reports and Recommendations of the Committees, 27 TAX
LAw. 818, 819 (1974).
' 2 See Id. at 818.
13
 See I.R.G. § 2055(a) (1976) (prior to amendment by the. 1976 Act).
" See I.R.C. 2056(d)(2) (1976) (prior to amendment by. the 1976 Act).
Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 62-63 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 58 T.C. 352
(1972).
16
 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). The court in Keinath did not clearly delineate the
relevant weight to be attached to federal and local law. 480 F.2d at 63.
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and gift tax purposes even if the applicable local law does not
technically characterize the refusal as a 'disclaimer' if the person
refusing the property was considered to have been the owner of
the legal title to the property before refusing acceptance of the
property. If a qualified disclaimer is made, the federal estate,
gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax provisions are to apply
with respect to the property interest disclaimed as if the interest
had never been transferred to the person making the dis-
claimer.' 7
At the same time as Congress enacted section 2518, it abrogated the
specific estate and gift tax sections dealing with disclaimers, since section
2518 was intended as a rule of general applicability for purposes of estate,
gift and generation-skipping taxation. The estate, gift and generation-
skipping transfer tax provisions relating to disclaimers are now integrated
in a single provision. Under section 2518, a "qualified disclaimer" is treated
for tax purposes as if the disclaimed interest were never transferred to the
disclaimant. Section 2518(b) defines a "qualified disclaimer" as an irrevoca-
ble and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest in property
which meets the following four requirements:
(1) The refusal must be in writing;
(2) This writing must be received by the transferor of the inter-
est, his legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to
the property to which the interest relates no later than nine
months after the later of either:
(a) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in
such person was made, or
(b) the day on which the disclaimant attains twenty-one;
( 3 ) The disclaimant must not have accepted the interest or any
of its benefits;
(4) As a result of the disclaimer, the interest must pass to some-
one other than the disclaimant (without any direction on the
part of the disclaimant).
In addition, section 25I8(c) permits disclaimers of an "undivided portion" of an
interest and sanctions the disclaimer of powers.
The attempt to assure uniform tax treatment of tax disclaimers through
section 2518 has not been entirely successful. Due to the verbiage of subsection
(b)(4) and the lack of detailed specificity in the statute, deference to local law is a
likelihood. Because of the continuing significance of local law, this article
will be concerned with the problems arising from the interreaction of fed-
eral and state law. In the course of this discussion, we shall draw upon the
provisions of the Massachusetts statute," and the various Uniform Acts, in-
cluding the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Disclaimer of Prop-
erty Interests Act. While other states have enacted disclaimer legislation,"
17 H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CoNG.
At,. NEWS 2897, 3421,
IS MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 191A (1975).
19 The author is acutely aware that disclaimer statutes in other states may differ consid-
erably from the illustrative statutes discussed herein. Because of the potentially large number
of such variations, the author has restricted himself to the illustrative statutes in the text.
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the Massachusetts statute and the Uniform Acts have been selected for il-
lustrative purposes only to demonstrate the resulting interplay of federal
and local law and the lack of uniformity in the treatment of taxpayers from
different states.
This article will also be concerned with the efficacy of section 2518 as a
practical estate planning technique in the area of partial disclaimers, perhaps
one of the most common practical uses of a disclaimer. The discussion will
reveal that the federal statutory language is less than satisfactory and that the
problems are accentuated by a brooding omnipresence of local law. While
possible solutions will be offered to some of these problems, including planning
and drafting suggestions, it is obvious that the "ball" is really in the congres-
sional "court" and that additional clarifying legislation is needed. Since the
disclaimer is a valuable post-transfer "planning" technique, such a congres-
sional effort would clearly be worthwhile.
II. DISCLAIMERS AND POST-TRANSFER PLANNING
In several ways, disclaimers play an important role in post-transfer es-
tate planning. They can rectify prior errors in planning the estate and im-
prove the tax positions of an estate, its beneficiaries, and others. By permit-
ting beneficiaries to adjust the size and content of particular gifts, the dis-
tribution of property can be made to conform to the realities faced by
those beneficiaries. In some circumstances, property in excess of the needs
of one beneficiary can be disclaimed so as to benefit another beneficiary.
Gifts of property inappropriate or inconvenient in form can be avoided,
and gifts which are too large or too small to achieve maximum tax advan-
tages can be modified. In short, disclaimers make possible useful adjust-
ments to an estate plan based on the facts and circumstances actually faced
by the transferor's beneficiaries.
One of the most important circumstances in which disclaimers may
prove useful is in connection with the marital deduction. Section 2056
permits a deduction of the greater of $250,000 or half the adjusted gross
estate2° from an adjusted gross estate for qualified property transferred by
a decedent to the surviving spouse. 2 ' While use of certain formula clauses
in wills and revocable trusts generally can assure that a marital deduction
equal to the maximum permitted to the decedent's estate will be taken, a
nonformula gift or an improperly formulated gift can be altered through a
disclaimer to achieve a maximum deduction. Thus, in the event the surviv-
ing spouse has not been given enough qualified property to create a
While the details of the statutes may vary considerably, almost all raise the same problems
when matched against § 2518.
20
 Section 2056 allows a deduction from the gross estate for qualified property passing
to the surviving spouse, subject to a limit of the greater of $250,000 or half the value of the
adjusted gross estate. For a discussion of section 2056, see in this issue Piper & Fremont-
Smith, Principles for Effective Use of Marital Deductions, at p. 403 supra.
21
 I.R.C. § 2056(b); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-(I) (1958).
Qualification of property for the marital deduction is of course an enormously complex
area. See 1.R.C. § 2056 (and the regulation thereunder). The most common forms of qualified
property are outright gifts to the surviving spouse and gifts in trust with annual income for
life for the surviving spouse coupled with general power of appointment in the spouse. pos-
session of such incidents of ownership at the death of the survivor, of necessity, makes such
property includible in the surviving spouse's estate at death under I.R.C. $$ 2033 and 2041.
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maximum marital deduction, the deduction may be increased to the
maximum possible amount by a timely disclaimer in favor of the surviving
spouse on the part of someone other than the surviving spouse."
Conversely, a surviving spouse may wish to disclaim part or all of
marital deduction property received if it exceeds the maximum permissible
marital deduction. If not disclaimed, the excess may be taxed both in the
deceased spouse's estate and also in the surviving spouse's estate. 23 If the
disclaimer causes the excess to pass into a trust taxable at the death of the
first spouse but not includible in the second spouse's estate, the disclaimer
prevents this double taxation. A disclaimer by the surviving spouse also
may be desirable even where the amount of the property passing to the
surviving spouse equals but does not exceed the maximum marital deduc-
tion. Such a situation arises, first, where the surviving spouse's assets are
substantial enough so that the total taxes on both estates may be larger
than if the marital deduction had been used to a lesser extent in the estate
of the first decedent. 24
 This may occur because of the augmentation of the
survivor's estate by the marital deduction gift. Here, a disclaimer which
subjects the property to taxation in the deceased spouse's estate may be
preferable to deferring a tax on the marital deduction portion until the
surviving spouse's death. The disclaimer may also be appropriate where a
maximum marital deduction is unnecessary to eliminate the obligation to
pay estate taxes on the first decedent's death. The unified credit available
under section 2010 might eliminate any tax liability on the first decedent's
estate without the maximum marital deduction, and therefore taking the
maximum deduction would unnecessarily augment the size of the survivor's
estate.
Another circumstance in which a disclaimer may be advisable is when
a transfer to a surviving spouse is formally defective so that it does not
qualify for the marital deduction under section 2056. For example, assume
that a marital deduction trust is created under the terms of which the sur-
viving spouse is to receive income for life and has a general testamentary
power to appoint the remainder as she may see fit, but the trustee has the
power to retain unproductive property for an unreasonable period of time.
The current Treasury Regulations indicate that the trust will not qualify
for a marital deduction because the retention of such property by the trus-
tee may preserve the property at the expense of the spouse's enjoyment of
the property and its income. 23
 The trust therefore will be subject to estate
taxation in the deceased spouse's estate. At the same time, the property also
may be subject to estate taxation in the surviving spouse's estate unless the
latter disclaims the general power of appointment. A disclaimer of that
power of appointment would convert the defective gift to the spouse into
"See I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2) (1976) (prior to amendment by the 1976 Act).
" That is, since qualified marital deduction property may be includible in the surviving
spouse's estate, the amount. of qualified property passed to the spouse in excess of the
maximum permissible deduction may be taxed both when the first spouse dies, and, again,
with the previously deductible marital property, when the surviving spouse dies.
Under I.R.C. § 2033, all property which the surviving spouse owns outright is includible
in the survivor's estate and under § 2041 property subject to a general testamentary power of
appointment is also includible in the survivor's estate.
" See W. SCHWARTZ, FUTURE INTERESTS ik ESTATE PLANNING, § 14.14 (Supp. 1977).
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(W-5(0(4)-(5) (1958).
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nonmarital property transferred to the trustee. This property, although
taxable in the decedent's estate, bypasses the estate of the surviving spouse,
who upon death will have no interest in the property, the life interest and
power given her having terminated. Thus, double taxation of the property
is avoided.
In addition to its use as a device to achieve estate tax savings, a dis-
claimer may be used to adjust the division of a residual estate to .reflect
economic circumstances not foreseen in planning the estate. For example,
suppose that at the time he drafted a will, T had no spouse, but had three
children, all with similar financial needs. T therefore divided his residual
estate evenly among the three. At T's death, however, one of the children,
A, has become wealthy in his own right, whereas another, C, has contracted
a debilitating chronic disease. Even though the estate is to be divided
evenly, A effectively can increase C's share without incurring gift tax liabil-
ity by disclaiming his share, thus giving B and C half shares in the residue
of the estate. Had A not disclaimed and later given C additional gifts to
meet his needs, A might have had to pay taxes on the gifts. Thus, any time
a bequest becomes unnecessary or excessive, a disclaimer may be used and,
if the instrument creating the interests so permits, the disclaimed property
may pass to someone with greater need of it.
The estate tax charitable deduction may also be affected by a dis-
claimer. A proper disclaimer of property by a noncharitable beneficiary in
favor of a qualified charity results in the property qualifying for the chari-
table deduction. 28
 A disclaimer can be especially helpful in the context of a
gift to charity of a remainder interest. In order to qualify for the estate tax
charitable deduction, a trust must satisfy the detailed and technical re-
quirements of a charitable remainder trust. 27 If the trust fails to meet these
requirements, a charitable deduction could be preserved if the noncharita-
ble beneficiaries totally disclaim their interest and thus cause the charity to
receive the property outright.
Problems which arise from the tax on "generation-skipping" transfers
imposed by the 1976 Tax Reform Act also may be remedied by the timely
use of a disclaimer. If, for example, a trust was created which provided
that income was payable to the grantor's surviving spouse for life, then to
the grantor's child for life, and then to the grantor's grandchildren, the trust
would be a generation-skipping trust because beneficiaries of the trust are
assigned to two or more generation levels younger than the grantor's gen-
eration.28 Accordingly, a generation-skipping transfer tax might be im-
posed on the death of the grantor's child. This could be avoided if the
grantor's child disclaims his interest. Such a disclaimer would prevent the
trust from constituting a generation-skipping trust because there would no
longer be two or more generations of beneficiaries whose generation levels
are "younger" than that of the grantor. The grantor's widow is assigned to
the same generation as the grantor and hence there would be only one
level of younger generation beneficiaries, the grandchildren.29 Thus, where
one of the beneficiaries of a generation-skipping trust has no need of his
.28
 I.R.C. § 2055(a) (1976) (prior to amendment by the 1976 Act).
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.664 (1972).
28 See I.R.C. § 2611(b).
:9 See I.R.C. § 2611(c)(2).
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income interest, the imposition of the tax on an otherwise taxable termina-
tion may be avoided by a timely disclaimer of the unnecessary interest.
Finally, the disclaimer may be helpful if a person holds a general
power of appointment with respect to property. If the person dies holding
the power, the property subject to the power is includible in his gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes.'" This result can be avoided by the donee
during his lifetime by a disclaimer of the power, since section 2518 by its
terms applies to a "power" with respect to property."
In addition to being helpful post-transfer estate tax planning tools,
disclaimers are a useful way for living taxpayers to avoid present income
tax liability. For example, a disclaimant may not be required to include fu-
ture income attributable to the disclaimed property in his taxable income."
In addition, a person other than the grantor of a trust is treated for in-
come tax purposes as the owner of' a portion of a trust if, with respect to
such portion, that person has an exclusive power to vest the corpus or the
income of the trust in himself. 33 If the power referred to has been dis-
claimed within a reasonable time after the holder of the power first became
aware of its existence, such a person is not treated as the owner of the por-
tion of the trust. 34 Thus, timely disclaimer of income producing property
or of certain trust powers can prevent unnecessary incidence of income
taxation.
The disclaimer, when properly utilized, offers the estate planner not
only a tool for post-transfer correction of planning errors or miscalcula-
tions but also facilitates a fine tuning of an estate plan to compensate for
and adjust to changes in the financial conditions and circumstances of the
beneficiaries which were not foreseeable at the time the estate plan was
formulated. Unfortunately, the ability to take advantage of this useful es-
tate planning device is impaired because its tax status remains clouded de-
spite the enactment of section 2518.
III. CONTINUING FEDERAL—STATE DISCLAIMER CONFLICTS
A. The Impact of Section 2518(b)(4)
Section 2518 was enacted by Congress to achieve uniformity of result
among the taxpayers of different states who disclaim property. 35 Congress
sought to promote this goal by removing the Code's dependence on state law
to determine the effectiveness of a disclaimer. Unfortunately, section 2518
does not explicitly address the issue of uniformity. Instead, it utilizes lan-'
guage which probably mandates a reference to state law to determine the
effectiveness of a disclaimer.
" I.R.C.	 2041(a)(1).
31 I.R.C.	 2518(c)(2). Under earlier law, the same result was achieved, since §
2041(a)(2) specifically did not treat a disclaimer of a power as a taxable release or exercise of
the power.
"See Rev. Rul. 64-62, 1964-1 C. B. 221. However, the disclaimant may be required to
include the income in his taxable income where he had a right to receive or control the in-
come prior to the disclaimer. See Grant v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1949);
Robert. E. Cleary, 34 T.C. 728, 736 (1960).
33 See I.R.C. § 678.
34 I.R.C. § 678(d).
35 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Coln &
CONG. & Au. News 2897, 3421.
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The American Bar Association had proposed the following verbiage
for inclusion in the disclaimer legislation:
DISCLAIMERS INEFFECTIVE UNDER LOCAL LAW
—A disclaimer of property which is ineffective under gov-
erning law shall be given effect for the purpose of this section if
the property is transferred, within the time herein prescribed for
delivery of a disclaimer, to the person or persons who would
have been entitled thereto had the disclaimant predeceased the
prior holder of the property. 36
Similarly, the American Law Institute had recommended that a dis-
claimer be recognized for federal tax purposes if the beneficiary, in a
timely fashion, redirects the destination of the interest to another recipient,
even though local law would have deemed title to have vested in the dis-
claimant and to have been transferred by him. Such "timely redirection"
would be permissible provided that the disclaimant did not derive any tan-
gible beneficial enjoyment from the property. 37
These proposals would have satisfied congressional concern 38 that a
refusal to accept property be given effect for federal estate and gift tax
purposes even though local law does not technically characterize the refusal
as a disclaimer or if the person refusing the property is considered under
local law to have been the owner of the legal title to the property before re-
fusing its acceptance. Instead of following such a legislative course, Con-
gress inserted subsection (b)(4) into section 2518. That subsection provides
that a disclaimer is effective for tax purposes if "as a result of such refusal,
the interest passes to a person other than the person making the disclaimer
(without any direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer)."
Significantly, however, if the disclaimer is invalid or ineffective under local
law, the interest vests in the disclaimant and does not pass to another per-
son without further direction on the part of the disclaimant. Accordingly, if
subsection (b)(4) is to be taken at face value, the effectiveness of a dis-
claimer for tax purposes is dependent upon its status under the local prop-
erty law. Indeed, two leading commentators have concluded: "Con-
sequently, new I.R.C. § 2518 may not have totally superseded state dis-
claimer statutes, but instead, provided an additional set of conditions which
must be satisfied for purposes of the federal taxes. Consequently, a valid
disclaimer must satisfy both the requirements of I.R.C. § 2518 and the
applicable state disclaimer law. " 39
Moreover, the federal statute is silent with respect to important as-
pects of disclaimers. Thus, for example, section 2518 does not define some
of its key terms such as "person" and "irrevocable." In light of the congres-
sional quest for uniformity, a federal lexicon may be created by the federal
courts to define such terms. On the other hand, it is possible that the fed-
" See American Bar Association. Reports and Recommendations of the Committees, 27 Tax LAW.
818, 822-23 (1974).
37 Au, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gin TAX PROJECT, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN REFERENCE THERETO 40-41 (1969).
38
 H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7897, 3421.
39
 A. CASNER & R. STEIN, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER THE TAX REFORM Act' OF 1976, at 179
(1978).
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eral courts will defer to or be influenced by local law interpretations in
such areas where the federal statute provides no guidelines. Furthermore,
to the extent that subsection (b)(4) mandates a reference to local law, a dis-
claimer invalid under such local law because of the local treatment of the
issue will be invalid for federal tax purposes regardless of how section 2518
may otherwise view the problem. In such circumstances, variations in local
law will produce a nonuniform federal tax result for disclaimant . s who re-
side in different states.
Thus it would appear that two regimes, federal and state, will con-
tinue to be operative in the disclaimer sphere. Congress' goal of uni-
formity will be frustrated since the federal and the various state laws differ
one from another. Some of the areas of conflict between section 2518 and
state laws will now be examined.
B. Conflicts
I. Timing Conflicts
Section 2518 and local laws impose different requirements as to the
time for filing disclaimers. Section 2518(b)(2) prescribes that the disclaimer,
to be effective, must be received no later than the date which is 9 months
after the later of the day on which the transfer creating the interest in the
disclaimant was made or the day on which such person attains age twenty-
one. Local laws may have different time requirements. At common law,
there was no specific time within which a disclaimer had to be made. The
only requirement was that it be within a "reasonable" time. 4° The Uniform
Probate Code provides that an instrument renouncing a present interest
"shall be filed not later than [6] months after the death of the decedent"
and that an instrument renouncing a future interest "may be filed not later
than [9] months after the event determining that the taker of the property
or interest is finally ascertained and his interest is indefeasibly vested."'"
The Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers Under Nontestamentary Instruments
Act contains a similar provision for nontestamentary instruments." The
Massachusetts statute provides that a disclaimer must be filed not later than
9 months after the event determining that the beneficiary is finally ascer-
tained and that such interest is indefeasibly vested. 43 Unlike these statutes,
section 2518 does not, on its face, draw a distinction between present and
defeasible or contingent future interests.
The statutes may regulate the time period differently in various other
ways. Some statutes toll the time period if the person entitled to disclaim
does not have actual knowledge of the existence of the interest." Section
4° See authorities collected in UNIFORM PROBATE: CODE 2-801(b), Comment (5th ed.,
Official 1977 Text).
" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 2-801(b) (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
42 UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS UNDER NONTESTAMENTARV INSTRUMENTS ACT § 2
(1973). The Uniform Act, however, specifies (in brackets) a period of 6 months, rather than 9
months, to disclaim a future interest after the taker thereof is finally ascertained and his inter-
est is indefeasibly vested.
43 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 191 A,	 (1975).
44 See UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT, § 2(a) (1973) (doing so with re-
spect to nontestainentary interests).
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2518, the Uniform Probate Code and the Massachusetts statute do not con-
tain such an automatic tolling provision. However, while the Massachusetts
statute does authorize the court, upon petition, to permit an extension of'
time to execute and file a disclaimer, section 2518 and the various Uniform
Acts do not delegate such authority to the court.'"
In the case of beneficiaries under the age of 21, section 2518 sanc-
tions disclaimers filed 9 months after such a person attains the age of 21
even though 9 months had previously elapsed since the creation of the
interest." The Uniform Acts and the Massachusetts statutes do not contain
such a provision since they authorize disclaimers by guardians in behalf of
minors. 47 Section 2518 does not explicitly sanction disclaimers by guard-
ians. It merely speaks of a "person" refusing to accept an interest in
property." One may draw a negative inference, from the section's explicit
postponement of the time period to 9 months after a person attains 21,
that guardians may not disclaim. Thus as demonstrated by the foregoing
variations, section 2518 and the states seem to establish different time re-
quirements. In some instances, section 2518 may authorize a longer time
period than local law, while in others, a disclaimer sanctioned by local law
may be time-barred under section 2518.
For example, assume both that T devises land to "A for life, and then
to B and his heirs, but if B fails to marry C, then to D and his heirs" and
that B is over 21 years of age at T's death. To disclaim his interest effec-
tively for federal tax purposes, B would have to disclaim within nine
months after T's death. In states like Massachusetts or those having the
Uniform Probate Code, B could disclaim his interest effectively for local
purposes until the lapse of nine months after his interest became indefeasi-
bly vested. Prior to B's marriage to C, B's interest is not indefeasibly vested;
rather it is subject to total divestment in the event that B fails to marry C.
Thus, during A's life, as long as B has not married C and has not otherwise
accepted any benefits from the property, B could disclaim effectively even
though more than nine months had elapsed since T's death." This situa-
tion does not pose any problem of lack of uniformity of tax treatment if no
state has a time period shorter than that expressed in section 2518. In such
circumstances, section 2518 will control the federal estate and gift tax con-
sequences and, unless the disclaimer is filed within the section 2518(b)(2)
time period, it will be ineffective for tax purposes.
More troublesome, of course, is the case where a local law may pre-
scribe a shorter time period than section 2518. Assume that T devises
property to A in fee simple absolute and that A disclaims his interest seven
months after T's death. A statute may provide that a disclaimer of such a
present interest shall be filed not later than six months after T's death."
45 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 191A, § 3 (1975); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a),
Comment (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
46 1.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
47 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801 (5th ed., Official 1977 Text); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. C. 19IA, § 2 (1975).
I.R.C. § 2518(c).
48 Once A's estate terminates and B takes possession of the premises, B's ability to dis-
claim would be barred even though he has not as yet married C and his interest is defeasible,
because at that point B has accepted an interest in the property. See discussion of "ac-
ceptance," at notes 65-67 infra.
'° See, e.g., UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY I NTERESTS Act- § 2 (1973).
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On other other hand, section 2518 would allow the disclaimer to be filed
up until nine months after T's death. Likewise, Massachusetts, which pro-
vides that a disclaimer may be filed until the lapse of nine months after the
event determining that the beneficiary is finally ascertained and that such
interest is indefeasibly vested," would also authorize a disclaimer of such a
present interest to be filed up until nine months after T's death. To the ex-
tent that section 2518(b)(4) necessitates a reference to local law, the dis-
claimer would be ineffective for tax purposes in the first state but effective,
for tax purposes, in Massachusetts. Thus, there is a resulting lack of uni-
formity of tax treatment for residents of different states.
Timing difficulties also arise with respect to inter-vivos transfers
which are included in the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. For
example, assume that 0 by inter-vivos transfer gives property in trust "for 0
for life, and then to A and his heirs." Since 0 has retained a life estate, the
property is includible in 0's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. 52
When do we start counting the time period under section 2518 for dis-
claiming A's interest? The basic reference point mentioned in section
2518(b) is the date of the creation . of the interest. When is A's interest
deemed to be created? On the one-hand, the House Report defines "crea-
tion" as follows: "For purposes of this requirement, a transfer is considered
to be made when it is treated as a completed transfer for gift tax purposes
with respect to inter-vivos gifts or upon the date of the decedent's death
with respect to testamentary transfers." 53
While this explanation may be helpful in the instances where a trans-
fer can be characterized as being either exclusively an inter-vivos gift or a
testamentary transfer, it does not provide much guidance with respect to
inter-vivos transfers which are deemed to be completed gifts for gift tax
purposes but which are also includible in the transferor's gross estate. In
the example presented, for gift tax purposes, 0 has made a gift of the re-
mainder interest to A. Yet, the property will still be includible in 0's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes. 54 Thus, A's interest may appropri-
ately be referred to as being both the subject of an inter-vivos gift and a
testamentary transfer.
Further confusion emanates from the Conference Report, which pro-
vides:
The conferees intend to make it clear that the nine month
period for making a disclaimer is to be determined in reference
to each taxable transfer. For example, in the case of a general
power of appointment where the other requirements are satis-
fied, the person who would be the holder of the power will have
a nine-month period after the creation of the power in which to
disclaim and the person to whom the property would pass by
reason of the exercise or lapse of the power would have a
nine-month period after a taxable exercise, etc., by the holder of
the power in which to disclaim. Similarly, in the case where a
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 191A, § 3 (1975).
52 See I.R.C. § 2036.
52 H.R. REP. No, 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. &
All. NEWS 2897, 3421.
54 See W. SCI-IWARTZ, FUTURE INTERESTS & ESTATE PLANNING, § 8.18 (Supp. 1977).
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lifetime transfer is included in the transferor's gross estate be-
cause he had retained an interest in the property (e.g. sec. 2038),
the person who would receive an interest in the property during
the lifetime of the grantor will have a nine-month period after
the original transfer in which to disclaim and a person who
would receive an interest in the property on or after the gran-
tor's death would have a nine-month period after the grantor's
death in which to disclaim ... . 55
This language strongly suggests that section 2518 would treat the date
of 0's death as the date of the creation of A's interest and that A would
have nine months thereafter in which to disclaim. However, under the Uni-
form Disclaimer of Property Interests Act," and the Massachusetts stat-
ute," the disclaimer would have to be filed by A within a time period fol-
lowing the creation of the trust. Thus, the disclaimer may be time-barred
by the application of a shorter time period under the local law of some
states and there would, once again, be a lack of uniformity of tax treat-
ment.
As a final timing problem, the Conference Report also suggests an
internal inconsistency, within section 2518, with respect to defeasibly vested
interests. Pursuant to the foregoing quoted statement from the Conference
Report, 58
 a taker in default could disclaim up until nine months after the
lapse of the power of the appointment. A taker in default of appointment
may have a vested interest, subject to total divestment by an exercise of the
power, even prior to the power's lapse." In the example where T devised
land "to A for life, and then to B and his heirs, but if B fails to marry C,
then to D and his heirs," we indicated previously that to disclaim his inter-
est effectively for federal tax purposes under section 2518, B would have to
disclaim within nine months after T's death. It is difficult to reconcile one
result where the vested interest is defeasible by exercise of a power and an-
other where the interest is defeasible by some other act or event. It does
not suffice to suggest that the time period for disclaiming should run from
the lapse of' the power because the lapse is a taxable event as far as the
donee of the power is concerned." The creation of the power by T's will is
also a taxable event with respect to T, the donor of the power. Thus, it
could be plausibly contended that the interest of the taker in default should
be governed by the same rules applicable to other interests created by will.
2. Procedural Conflicts
Section 2518 and local laws also may differ with respect to different
procedural matters. Section 2518(b)(I) merely requires that the refusal to
accept a property interest be in writing." It does not indicate that it is to be
" H. CONF. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-624, reprinted in [1976) U.S.
CODE CONG. Se An, NEWS 2897, 4261-62.
"See UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT § 2 (1973) (within 6 months).
57 MASS, GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 191A, 3 (1975) (within 9 months).
'" See text at n.55 supra.
" W. SCHWAR'17., FUTURE INTERESTS & ESTATE PLANNING, § 9.3 (1977 Supp.).
"" I.R.C. §§ 2514(b)(e), 2041(3)(2), (b)(2).
I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1).
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signed, although that is probably assumed to be the case, and, if it is to be
signed, who the signatory should be. On the other hand, the Massachusetts
statute requires that the disclaimer shall be in writing, shall describe the
interest being disclaimed, shall declare the extent of the disclaimer, and
shall be signed by the beneficiary or the guardian of a disabled beneficiary
or the legal representative of a deceased beneficiary's estate.° 2 If real prop-
erty is being disclaimed, the disclaimer must be acknowledged in the man-
ner provided for deeds.° 3 Moreover, the Uniform Probate Code and the
Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act do not specify, in any detail
at all, the form of a disclaimer. The failure, in a given state, to satisfy that
jurisdiction's requisites as to form, could render the disclaimer ineffective. 64
To the extent that the formal requisites for a disclaimer may vary from
state to state, section 2518(b)(4) may cause disclaiming residents of differ-
ent states to he treated differently for tax purposes.
Section 2518(b) provides that a disclaimer must be "irrevocable" to be
effective for tax purposes. It does not, however, define the term. Here
again, section 2518(b)(4) would appear to require the incorporation by ref-
erence of local law on the revocability of disclaimers. There could be some
divergence of views at the local level. The Massachusetts statute specifically
provides that a disclaimer is irrevocable only when executed in accordance
with the formal requirements of the statute and filed in the Probate
Court." Although other statutes, such as the Uniform Probate Code, re-
quire a filing in the court, they do not address themselves to the issue of
the revocability of the disclaimer prior to such filing." It should be noted
that section 2518 does not, itself, specifically require a filing of the dis-
claimer in court. Such a requirement may be read into it, however, by the
incorporation of a state filing requisite pursuant to section 2518(b)(4).
Section 2518 and local laws may differ with respect to the service of
the disclaimer. Section 2518(b)(2) mandates that to be effective the dis-
claimer must be received by the transferor, his legal representative, or the
holder of the legal title to the property to which the interest relates. In con-
trast, the Massachusetts statute prescribes that service of the disclaimer be
made upon the person or entity having custody of the property, but the
failure to comply with the service requirement does not affect the validity
of the disclaimer. 67 Other statutes may mandate service of the disclaimer
but establish a class of recipients which is less broad than section 2518.
Thus, in the case of a revocable inter-vivos trust, section 2518 may sanction
service upon the settler's executors (i.e. his legal representative), while
other statutes may require service upon the trustee of the trust."
To the extent that these procedural requirements affect the validity of
a disclaimer, it would appear that a favorable tax result is available under
section 2518 only if the most stringent applicable standard is complied
with. Moreover, the several procedural conflicts between section 2518 and
state laws further undermine the congressional goal of uniformity of tax
treatment of disclaimers.
°s MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 19IA, § 4 (1975).
"Id. at § 5.
"Id. at § 7.
Id.
" See UNIFORM PROBATE CoI)E § 2-801(b)(3) (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 191 A, § 5 (1975).
"See UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT § 2(b) (1973).
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3. Bars to Disclaimer
Section 2518 explicitly deals with the only one bar to disclaimer. Sec-
tion 2518(b)(3) provides that a disclaimer is precluded if the disclaimant
has "accepted the interest or any of its benefits." This, of course, raises the
issue of the so-called partial disclaimer, whether a person may accept some
of the benefits of an interest, and disclaim other benefits thereof. This
topic will be the focus of attention in Part IV of this article. Here we are
concerned only with defining the scope of acceptance in the context of a
whole, rather than a partial, disclaimer.
Section 2518 and some statutes, such as the Uniform Probate Code, 69
do not define the term "acceptance" with any degree of precision. On the
other hand, the Massachusetts statute provides that an acceptance occurs if
the beneficiary, having knowledge of the existence of an interest, receives
without objection a benefit from such interest. 70 Section 2518 does not
explicitly include knowledge of the existence of the interest as a predicate
for an acceptance of the interest. The Regulations existent before the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 provided: "In the absence of facts to the contrary, if a
person fails to refuse to accept a transfer to him of ownership of a dece-
dent's property within a reasonable time after learning of the existence of
the transfer, he will be presumed to have accepted the property."" It is
unclear, as of this date, whether this concept will be perpetuated in new
regulations. In any event, to the extent that local law defines "acceptance"
as including knowledge of the interest, such a local law interpretation may
be given effect under section 2518(b)(4).
Even more troublesome is the issue of whether a disclaimer will be
barred for federal tax purposes if the disclaimant has disposed of the
interest, waived the right to disclaim, or is insolvent. The federal statute is
silent with respect to these matters. While arguably a disposition in at least
certain circumstances could also be construed as an "acceptance," in-
solvency certainly cannot be dealt with under that rubric. The Massachu-
setts statute specifically includes insolvency as a bar to a disclaimer." Other
statutes, such as the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Disclaimer of
Property Interests Act, do not list insolvency as a bar. By virtue of section
2518(b)(4), insolvent disclaimants from different states may be treated
nonuniformly for tax purposes.
It is also not totally clear whether a transferor may limit the capacity
of a beneficiary to disclaim. Section 2518 is again silent on this issue. Al-
though statutes, such as the Massachusetts statute" and the Uniform Pro-
bate Code," provide that the right to disclaim exists notwithstanding any
limitation on the interest of the disclaimant in the nature of a spendthrift
provision or similar restriction, these provisos may have the effect of inva-
lidating the total prohibition of a disclaimer by the creator of the interest:"
"See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE g 2-801(d)(1) (5th ed.. Official 1977 Text).
"See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 191A, § 8 (1975).
" Treas. Reg. g 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
72 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 191A, g 8 (1975).
la Id. § 9.
" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d)(2) (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
" Total prohibition on disclaimers is clearly void under the Massachusetts statute since
Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 19IA, § 2 (1975) states that a beneficiary may disclaim any interest
"unless barred" by § 8.
564
DISCLAIMERS
They may not necessarily preclude the imposition by the transferor of ad-
ditional procedures for disclaiming. For example, could a testator require
that the disclaimer be delivered to the testator's issue or that it be made
within three months after his death? If state law tolerates such additional
requirements and such a state-sanctioned requirement is read into federal
disclaimer law by virtue of section 2518(b)(4), the net result is that the
whim of an individual transferor may limit the availability of section 2518.
Yet, if such restrictions are authorized, greater unevenness of result can be
expected. Thus, the estate planner faces not only a question of the extent
to which state disclaimer laws may impose barriers to effective disclaimers
not raised by section 2518, but also whether an individual transferor, with
state law approval, may do the same thing.
Section 2518 will, by its own terms, place some strictures on the indi-
vidual whims of disclairnants. It is true that some disclaimer statutes may
not preclude conditional disclaimers and may provide that a disclaimer
"shall be effective according to its terms." 78 It would thus appear to be pos-
sible under such a statute to execute a disclaimer which contains condi-
tional terms. For example, assume that T devises land to "A for life, and
then to B and his heirs if B marries C," that B is over 21 years of age at T's
death, and that B has not as yet married C. If B files a disclaimer after T's
death," pursuant to which he disclaims his interest only in the event his
gross income is more than $100,000 per year at the time his interest ,be-
comes possessory, this disclaimer may be effective according to its terms
tinder local law. For that purpose, B will be deemed to have disclaimed if,
but only if, his gross income is more than $100,000 per annum. On the
other hand, this disclaimer will not be effective for federal tax purposes.
Section 2518(b) defines an effective disclaimer as meaning "an irrevocable
and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest." B's disclaimer is
ineffective for tax purposes since it does not constitute an unqualified re-
fusal to accept the interest. Thus, while section 2518 may conceivably grant
some limited autonomy to transferors, it confers no such flexibility upon
clisclai man ts.
4. Who May Disclaim?
Section 2518 merely addresses itself to a "person" refusing to accept
an interest in property. It does not define the term "person."
May a guardian of a minor or incompetent person disclaim in behalf
of his ward? While some statutes, such as the Uniform Probate Code 78 and
the Massachusetts statute 79 authorize disclaimers by guardians, the federal
statute may be construed as precluding disclaimers by guardians for
minors. This conclusion is based upon the negative inference drawn from
the proviso in section 2518(b)(2) authorizing disclaimers up until nine
months after a beneficiary attains the age of 21. 89 If, indeed, the subsection
"See, e.g., Mass. GEN, LAWS ANN. c. 191A, § 7 (1975).
" Although the time limit for B's disclaiming is 9 months alter his interest becomes in-
defeasibly vested (which occurs when B marries C), a disclaimer may nevertheless be filed ear-
lier than'then. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN, c. 191A, § 3 (1975).
78 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801 (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
79 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 191A, § 2 (1975).
It should be noted that § 2518 uses the age of '21 rather than age 18 or some other
age for attainment of majority under local law.
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is so construed, the guardian and the minor are confronted with a di-
lemma. If the guardian cannot disclaim, and he applies the property for
the benefit of the minor as he may be required to do under local law, this
may constitute an "acceptance" which may preclude the minor from dis-
claiming after he attains the age of 21. Furthermore, in some instances,
overall family tax savings could be achieved by a disclaimer in behalf of a
minor prior to his attainment of the age of 21. Assume that a minor is
terminally ill and will, with certainty, die in the very near future. A dis-
claimer would be desirable since it would insulate the property from estate
taxation upon the minor's death. Yet, the negative inference to be drawn
from section 2518(b)(2) would preclude such a disclaimer."
If section 2518(b)(2) is construed as precluding disclaimers by guar-
dians of minors, a further incongruity could result. Section 2518 is silent,
in all respects, with respect to disclaimers in behalf of incompetents. Under
local law," a disclaimer may possibly be executed by the representative of
an incapacitated person. If section 2518 is construed as authorizing dis-
claimers in such jurisdictions, but only in those states, the assets of minors
will be treated differently for federal tax disclaimer purposes than the
property of other disabled persons. Furthermore, to the extent that local
laws differ from each other, there may be nonuniformity of tax results for
residents of different states. This consequence may be inevitable regardless
of how section 2518 is itself otherwise construed, to the extent that subsec-
tion (b)(4) mandates a reference to local law.
Section 2518 is also silent with respect to the impact of the death of a
beneficiary. Is the executor, or administrator of the deceased beneficiary the
"person" who may disclaim under section 2518? The problem is further
compounded by the variations in local law. In some states, 83 the executor
or administrator of a deceased beneficiary may disclaim provided that the
Probate Court determines that the disclaimer is in the best interests of
those interested in the estate of the deceased beneficiary and not detrimen-
tal to the best interests of the estate. On the other hand, other statutes pro-
vide that the right to disclaim "does not survive the death of the person
having it."84
 It has been stated that, absent a statute, the latter view repre-
sents the general rule," If the silence of section 2518 with respect to dis-
claimers by executors or administrators is construed as authorizing such
disclaimers to the extent it is sanctioned by local law, the net result, again,
is the nonuniform tax treatment of disclaiming executors and adminis-
SI
 The authorization of a disclaimer by a guardian in behalf of a minor would not un-
duly prejudice the interests of the minor. In some states, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c.
191A, § 2 (1975), the disclaimer would be subject to the prior approval of the Probate Court,
which would have to be satisfied that the disclaimer is not detrimental to the best interests of
the minor. Under the Uniform Probate Code, see, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 5-209 (5th
ed., Official 1977 Text), the guardian is under an obligation to apply the minor's property for
the benefit of the minor and thus would be foolhardy to execute a disclaimer without advance
approval by the court.
"See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 2-801(a); MASS. GEN, LAWS ANN. C. 191A, § 2
(1973).
"See, e.g., Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN, C. 191 A, 2 (1975).
Sa See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a) (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
" See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a), Comment (5th ed., Official 1977 Text). See
also text at note 46 supra.
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trators in different states. Even if section 2518's silence is not construed to
require reference to state law on this point, such a result may nevertheless
be reached since subsection (b)(4) may mandate a reference to local law.
IV. "ACCEPTANCE" AND PARTIAL DISCLAIMERS
Partial disclaimers constitute one of the most important potential uses
of the disclaimer device. As discussed in Part II, a surviving spouse may
wish to receive a portion of the marital deduction bequest but renounce the
balance of it. Likewise, the beneficiary who has been given a life interest
and a general power of appointment may find it desirable to "accept" the
life interest but disclaim the general power of appointment. Although these
examples involve some of the most propitious uses of disclaimers, there is
some doubt and uncertainty as to the effectiveness of a partial disclaimer.
The barriers to the effective use of a partial disclaimer stem from the lan-
guage of section 2518 and the possible variations in local law on the sub-
ject.
Section 2518(b)(3) bars disclaimers if the beneficiary has "accepted the
interest or any of its benefits." Unfortunately, the House Report explains
the concept with the use of a broad brush. It states:
For purposes of this requirement, the exercise of a power
of appointment to any extent by the donee of the power is to be
treated as an acceptance of its benefits. In addition, the ac-
ceptance of any consideration in return for making the dis-
claimer is to be treated as an acceptance of its benefits."
The breadth of this language, and the verbiage in section 2518(b)(3) refer-
ring to acceptance of any of the benefits of the interest, could be construed
together to preclude partial disclaimers even in those circumstances where
its use is most desirable.
Section 2518(c)(1) is also relevant to the partial disclaimer issue. It au-
thorizes a disclaimer with respect to "an undivided portion of an inter-
est."87 This subsection could be construed as sanctioning one type of partial
disclaimer—the disclaimer of an undivided portion. Thus, a person who is
given the entire interest in property could effectively disclaim an undivided
one half interest therein and accept the other one half interest as a tenant
in common." Although there has been an acceptance of some of the bene-
fits of the interest, it could be plausibly contended that the subsection over-
rides the bar to disclaimer posed by subsection (b)(3), the "acceptance" sub-
section. On the other hand, subsection (c)(1) could be construed literally as
authorizing the disclaimer of an "undivided portion" only where the "undi-
vided portion" is the only interest being transferred to the disclaimant.
Thus, the reach of subsection (c)(I) could be limited to the following type
of case: Assume that T owns an undivided one half interest in realty as
tenant in common with X, who owns the other half. T devises his undi-
vided one half to A. Since A has been given the undivided portion and
86 H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. Se
AD. NEWS 2897, 3421.
" I.R.C. § 2518(c).
63 See J. McCoRD, 1976 ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REFORM: ANALYSIS, EXPLANATION AND
COMMENTARY 255 (1977).
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nothing else, A may disclaim the entire one half interest. Such a literal in-
terpretation does have the effect of reconciling subsection (c)(I) with sub-
section (b)(3), the "acceptance" proviso. The recognition of the disclaimer
would not do violence to the "acceptance" concept since, as a result of the
total disclaimer of the undivided interest, the disclaimant does not receive
any benefits from the property.
However, such a narrow construction would frustrate post-transfer
planning, which as indicated above, may entail the use of partial disclaimers
of more extensive interests. In addition, it is inconsistent with the position
of the regulations existent immediately prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1976. The regulations provided:
In any case where a power is purported to be disclaimed or
renounced as to only a portion of the property subject to the
power, the determination as to whether or not there has been a
complete and unqualified refusal to accept the rights to which
one is entitled will depend on all the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, taking into account the recognition and effec-
tiveness of such disclaimer under local law. Such rights refer to
the incidents of the power and not to other interests of the pos-
sessor of the power in the property. If effective under local law,
the power may be disclaimed or renounced without disclaiming
or renouncing such other interests ... . 89
These regulations thus appear to sanction the disclaimer of a general
power even though the donee of the power, for example, retains a life es-
tate in the appointive property. It is difficult to fit such a partial disclaimer
within the confines of a narrow construction of the term "undivided por-
tion." Yet, if such a disclaimer is not sanctioned by section 2518, the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 will have regressed from that more liberal position.
It is encouraging to note that the Revenue Service, in a Letter Rul-
ing, 9° has sanctioned a partial disclaimer. In the case postulated in that rul-
ing, the taxpayer sought to renounce all interests inherited from a testator,
including a special power of appointment over corpus and intestate inter-
ests but specifically reserved the right to receive discretionary distributions
of income and corpus from the trustees of a realty trust and also the inter-
ests received outright in certain realty. The Service deferred to Texas law
which recognized partial disclaimers, and sanctioned the disclaimer since'
the disclaimed interests passed under Texas law to someone other than the
disclaimant. The Service pointed out that under Texas law, "acceptance of
a portion of the outright legacy and part of the trust interest does not
function as an acceptance of the interests subject to the disclaimer."9 '
In addition to the foregoing hurdles to be overcome because of the
language of section 2518, subsection (b)(4) could be construed as mandat-
ing a reference to local law. Thus, even if section 2518 is interpreted as au-
thorizing partial disclaimers, the fate of such disclaimers could be depen-
dent upon their status under local law. The status of partial disclaimers is
" Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2041-3(d)(6), 25.2514-3(0(5) (1958).
" LR.C. Letter Rul. 7803065 (Oct. 21, 1977).
91 Id.
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uncertain in many states, with the result often turning on whether the gift
is "severable" or constitutes a "single, aggregate" gift." In contrast, the
Uniform Probate Code clearly sanctions partial as well as total disclaimers." 3
The Massachusetts statute contains language similar to section 2518(c)(1),"
but partial disclaimers seem to be sanctioned since another section of that
act provides that the assignment, waiver or acceptance "of a part of an
interest in property shall not bar the right to disclaim any other part of
such interest."" These variations in local law could lead to a diversity of tax
results for partial disclaimants who reside in different states.
Partial disclaimers, in the context of joint tenancies, present particu-
larly troublesome problems. Assuming that section 2518(c)(1) is construed
as authorizing the joint tenant to disclaim the .undivided interest accruing
to him by right of survivorship, such a disclaimer could still be barred if
subsection (b)(4) is construed as mandating a reference to local law and
local law does not sanction such a disclaimer." In the absence of a statute,
it is doubtful that a surviving joint tenant can disclaim after the death of
the deceased tenant." In some jurisdictions, this uncertainty stems from
the fact that the survivor receives his interest by operation of law, rather
than from the decedent, and the survivor was deemed to be the owner of
the entire property even during the lifetime of' the decedent, subject to a
similar property interest or right of participation in the decedent. Under
this theory, the death of the decedent does not result in the survivor gain-
ing any new rights—which he could disclaim—upon the decedent's death.
However, some statutes" authorize a disclaimer of the accretive portion
derived through survivorship. The Massachusetts statute sanctions a dis-
claimer except that the survivor may not disclaim that portion of the jointly
owned property "which is allocable to amounts contributed by him or her
to the interest in such property."""
The Massachusetts statute represents an attempt to correlate disclaim-
ers with the federal estate taxation of joint tenancies under section 2040 of
the Internal Revenue Code. As a general rule, section 2040 utilizes a "con-
sideration furnished" test for determining includibility of an interest in the
decedent's gross estate. For example, if A and B are joint tenants and A
dies first, the amount includible in A's gross estate hinges generally upon
the percentage of the purchase price which A furnished for the acquisition
of the property.'" if A furnished the entire consideration, 100% of the
92 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a), Comment (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
"3 Id.
94
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 19IA, § I (1975) (authorizing a disclaimer of "any fractional
part, share or portion" of an interest).
95 1d. § 8.
99
 Even if local law does sanction such disclaimers, the surviving joint tenant may have
difficulty in disclaiming the other undivided one half if he accepted an interest therein and if
such acceptance bars the disclaimer under state law. For example, if the survivor had posses-
sion of the property prior to the death of the first decedent, the survivor's possession should
be deemed an acceptance and bar a disclaimer of his undivided one half interest, which he
owned prior to the death of the first decedent.
' See Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970), motion denied, 431
F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1971).
" See e.g., UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS Act, § 2(c) (1973).
99 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c, 191A, § 2 (1975).
'a° The major exception is that if it is "a qualified joint interest" 50% of the property
may be excluded from A's gross estate. See 1.11.C. § 2040(b). Even though A paid the entire
consideration, if A created the joint tenancy with hii spouse and the creation of the joint ten-
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value of the property would be included in A's gross estate. Unless the sur-
vivor could disclaim the accretive portion derived through survivorship, the
survivor's subsequent efforts to transfer may result in such transfers being
subjected to gift or estate taxation, and a form of double taxation would
ensue. This consequence is avoided by permitting the survivor to disclaim.
On the other hand, the same justification for disclaimer does not exist
where the first decedent contributed nothing to the acquisition of the
property, and the survivor furnished the entire consideration. In that situa-
tion, generally speaking,'°' nothing will be includible in the first decedent's
gross estate and thus there will be no double taxation upon a subsequent
transfer—inter-vivos at death—by the survivor. Hence, the Massachusetts
statute concludes that the survivor may not disclaim to the extent that the
survivor furnished the consideraction.'° 2
 However, under a statute au-
thorizing a disclaimer by a survivor who did furnish the entire considera-
tion, the survivor could disclaim the accretive portion passing by survivor-
ship even though nothing was includible in the first decedent's gross estate.
While subsection (b)(4) may mandate a reference to local law on other mat-
ters, it is questionable as to whether deference should be paid to state law if
the net effect thereof is to disrupt the pattern of estate taxation which the
federal government has established for joint tenancies.
It should be noted that the Massachusetts statute does not clarify how
the "allocation" of contributions to the purchase price is to be made. In
particular, the statute fails to specify whether the contribution test is to be
applied upon the basis of contributions in fact or upon contributions from
a tax perspective. For example, assume that the survivor's contribution to
the acquisition price was given to him by the decedent in an earlier and
separate donative transaction. In such a case, the decedent is deemed to
have contributed the entire consideration and the survivor's contribution is
treated' as zero for purposes of section 2040. 103 In that event, the entire
value of the property is generally includible in the first decedent's gross es-
tate for federal estate tax purposes. It is not totally clear whether the Mass-
achusetts statute would also be construed in such a case as classifying the
survivor as a non-contributor and thus entitling him to disclaim.
V. DRAFTING AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
The promulgation of section 2518, with the attendant ambiguities de-
scribed in Parts III and IV of this article, should cause the prudent estate
planner to bear the following points in mind:
1. Choice of Law
The evolving rules of conflict of laws may enable the draftsman, by a
declaration of intent in the instrument, to select the law governing the dis-
ancy was a gift for gift tax purposes (in the case of personal property) or A elected to treat it
as a gift (in the case of realty under I.R.C. § 2515), and A and his spouse are the only joint
tenants, 50% will be excluded from A's estate if he is the first decedent.
'°' In the case of a "qualified joint interest," 50% would he includible in the first dece-
dent's gross estate. See, I.R.C. § 2040(b). See note 100 supra.
102 This result is consistent with the recommendation of the American Bar Association.
See American Bar Association, Reports and Recommendations of the Committees, 27 TAX. LAW. 818,
820, 823 (1974).
'°3 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)(4) (1958)70
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position. 1 U 4 We have observed that the effectiveness of a disclaimer may
depend upon its status under local law and that jurisdictions may vary in
their treatment of disclaimers. In making a choice of a governing jurisdic-
tion in the instrument, the drafters should give some weight to the treat-
ment given the disclaimers by the various involved states in light of the im-
portance, if any, to be attached to the disclaimer in comparison to other
relevant legal issues. This, of course, assumes that deference will be paid to
the transferor's selection of the governing law even though the clisciaimant
resides in another jurisdiction.
2. Alternate Takers and the Marital Deduction
Subsection (14(4) requires that. the disclaimed interest must pass to
someone other than the disclaimant without any direction on the part of the
disclaimant. Thus, assume that T specifically bequeaths property to X who is
also the sole residuary legatee. Assume that X disclaims the specific legacy
and that under local law, the disclaimed legacy falls into the residue. The
disclaimer of the specific legacy would not be effective under subsection
(b)(4) since the legacy does not pass to someone other than the disclaimant.
To guard against this possibility, the testator's estate planner should explicitly
provide for an alternative taker in the event of a disclaimer)"
This problem is particularly acute with respect to the disclaimer of a
residuary marital deduction trust, or a portion thereof. In such circum-
stances, the disclaimed portion may pass to the residuary nonmarital de-
duction trust and the surviving spouse may also be a beneficiary of the
nonmarital trust. If the wife has a life estate and a special power of ap-
pointment in the nonmarital deduction trust, it can be plausibly contended
that the disclaimed interest does not pass to someone other than the dis-
claimant and hence the disclaimer is ineffective. The same result would
probably obtain if the wife is a member of a group of beneficiaries to
whom the income of the nonmarital trust may be distributed and each
member of the group must receive an equal share of the income and the
wife also has a special power)"
The problem is more complex where the surviving spouse will not
necessarily receive any interest under the nonmarital trust. Assume, for ex-
ample, that the surviving spouse is not given a mandatory interest or power
in the nonmarital trust nor appointed as a trustee of the trust, but that the
spouse is a member of a group to whom the trustees may, in their uncon-
trolled discretion, make unequal distributions of income and corpus, and
the trustees are authorized, in their uncontrolled discretion, to make no
distributions at all to any particular group member, including the spouse.
Since the spouse is only a possible appointee, it may be contended that un-
less amounts are actually distributed to her the spouse has no property
"' See W. Sctiwnwrz, FUTURE: 1NTERFsrs & ESTATE PLANNING ** 4.7, 6.25 (1977 Supp.).
"Th The testator's designation of an alternative taker will govern and be given effect. See,
e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c) (5th ed., Official 1977 Text); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C.
191A, 7 (1975).
Quaere, however, as to whether there could not be, at a minimum, it partial dis-
claimer consisting of a reduction of the general power which existed under the marital deduc-
tion trust to the special power under the nonmarital trust. The language of the House Report
could be construed as precluding such a partial disclaimer. H.R. REP. No.94-1380, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 67, reprinted in (19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2897, 3421.
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interest in the nonmarital trust, but merely an expectancy.'" However, in
such circumstances, it may be vigorously contended that the disclaimer is
ineffective on the grounds that the requirement of subsection (b)(4) that
the interest pass to someone other than the disclaimant as a result of the
disclaimer has not been satisfied. Until such time as a distribution is made
to some member of the group, a parity of reasoning leads to the conclusion
that the property does not pass to another person, just as it did not, under
this rationale pass to the surviving spouse. Since the trustees do not acquire
a beneficial interest, the relevant beneficial "interest" does not pass to them
either. For the same reason, it is even possible that the same problem—
failure of the property to pass to some other person—may occur even if
the spouse is not a permissible appointee of the totally discretionary non-
marital deduction trust. However, this conclusion is less likely since the
beneficial interest will ultimately pass to someone other than the spouse.
To guard against the possible invalidation of a disclaimer of a marital
deduction trust then, it may be desirable for the estate planner to draft the
residuary trust in a manner so as to exclude the surviving spouse as a bene-
ficiary of the nonmarital trust if the planner concludes that the advantages
of an effective disclaimer outweigh the loss of benefits to the spouse under
the nonmarital trust. 108
Finally, it should be noted that the problem discussed herein will be
obviated by the enactment of the Technical Corrections Bill. It contains a
proviso which validates a disclaimer even though the property passes to the
surviving spouse as a result of the disclaimer.'"
3. Controlling the Disposition of Property
The estate planner should anticipate the possibility of a disclaimer
from the perspective of the devolution.of the property in the event of a
disclaimer. Although statutes commonly designate the alternate recipient of
the disclaimed property,"° the statutory selection of the alternate taker
may not be consistent with the transferor's wishes. Thus, it is desirable to
anticipate the disclaimer and to provide expressly for an alternative disposi-
tion in the event of a disclaimer. An express manifestation of intent as to
an alternate taker will be given effect and will override the statutory
scheme which is operative usually only in the absence of such intent."'
4. Powers
Section 2518(0(2) clearly authorizes the disclaimer of powers. It has
been suggested that the congressional intent to sanction the disclaimer of
powers is so clear that the disclaimer will be effective even though the ef-
10? See W. ScHWARTI. FUTURE INTERESTS & ESTATE PLANNING, § 13.2 (1977 Supp.).
1 ° 8 For a suggested form, see A. CASNER & R. STEIN, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER THE TAX
REFORM Acror 1976. at 181-182 (1978).
1 °' Technical Corrections Bill of 1977, H.R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (§ 5(m) ).
"° See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c) (5th ed., Official 1977 Text); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. C. 191A, § 7 (1975).
1 " MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 191A, § 7 (1975). Such an approach may not be available,
of course, with respect to some interests which pass by operation of law to a survivor such as
joint tenancy property.
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fect of the disclaimer may be to extinguish the power, without the power
passing to a person other than the disclaimant. 12 The apparent inconsis-
tency between subsection (c)(2) and the requirement of subsection (b)(4)
that the interest pass to a person other than the disclaimant may be recon-
ciled on the basis of two rationales.
First, it can be claimed that subsection (b)(4) is satisfied because even
though the power is not transferred, the property which is the subject of
the power does pass to some other person. Thus, assume that X is the trus-
tee of a trust "for the benefit of Y for life, remainder to Z and his heirs"
and that X has the power to invade corpus and pay all of it to Y. X's dis-
claimer results in the corpus vesting indefeasibly in Z, who is a person
other than X within the meaning of subsection (b)(4). Prior to the dis-
claimer, Z's interest was subject to total divestiture by an exercise of the
power of appointment.
Second, it has been suggested that subsection (c)(2) may override sub-
section (b)(4). 13 Under this view, the disclaimer of powers may be effective
for tax purposes even, though such a disclaimer may not be valid under
state law and even though the power does not pass to another person but is
merely eliminated by the disclaimer.
Aside from these conceptual problems, there is, in many instances, a
solid estate planning reason for an estate planner to provide for an alterna-
tive donee of the power in the event of a disclaimer. Under some stat-
utes,''" a disclaimer of a power does not result in the power passing to
another person but rather it causes an elimination of the power. This is
undesirable if the transferor's objectives included a flexible and discretion-
ary management of the property and/or its beneficial enjoyment and he
hoped to attain that end by a prudent exercise of the power. If an alterna-
tive donee is available, the estate planner may wish to designate an alter-
nate holder of the power in the event of a disclaimer. In addition to satisfy-
ing the transferor's desire for flexibility, the designation of an alternative
donee will result in the power passing to someone other than the disclaim-
ant and thus obviate the conceptual problem posed by the requirement of
subsection (b)(4) that the interest pass to a person other than the disclaim-
ant.
5. Partial Disclaimers
As indicated in Part IV, a partial disclaimer may be valid if it repre-
sents an "undivided portion of an interest." This raises the question
whether a partial disclaimer could be expressed in the form of a dollar
amount rather than a fraction or percentage of the property. Until the
matter is clarified, if' it is possible to do so, it may be prudent to phrase the
disclaimer in the form of a fraction or percentage)"
" 2 See A. CASNER 8e R. STEIN, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER TIIE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at
183 (1978).
"3 See J. McGoan, 1976 ESTATE Se Gin' TAX REFORM, ANALYSIS. EXPLANATION & COM-
MENTARY 255 (1977).
114 See, fr g M ASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 19IA, § 7 (1975).
"3 See Northeastern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967) re-
jecting the position of Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958), which states that for purposes of
the marital deduction a surviving spouse's right to receive all of the income from a "specific
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6. Acceleration of Future Interests
Some statutes" 6 may provide for an alternative disposition of the dis-
claimed interest but may not explicitly deal with the impact of a disclaimer
of one interest upon other interests in the property, such as future inter-
ests."' Other statutes purport to come directly to grips with the problem.
Thus, the Uniform Probate Code provides that "[a] future interest that
takes effect in possession or enjoyment after the termination of the estate
or interest renounced takes effect as though the person renouncing had
predeceased the decedent or the donee of the power. A renunciation re-
lates back for all purposes to the date of the death of the decedent or the
donee of the power.'" The Official Comment to the Uniform Probate
Code states that this verbiage has the effect of accelerating remainders." 9
In states having no definitive rule as to whether an acceleration oc-
curs, it would certainly be prudent for the estate planner to spell out
explicitly the effect of a disclaimer upon future interests. The same dili-
gence is called for even in states having an acceleration rule since the
statutory result may not coincide with the transferor's wishes. For example,
assume that -r leaves his estate in trust to pay the income to his son for life,
remainder to his son's children who survive him, and that S disclaims with
two children then living. The Uniform Probate Code is construed so that
the remainder in the children accelerates; the trust terminates and the two
children receive possession and enjoyment, even though the son may sub-
sequently have other children or one or more of the two living children
may die during the son's lifetime."° Did T actually intend such a result?
Did T desire to give it to the son's children even if they don't survive their
father? Did T wish to exclude afterborn children of the son? Unless these
matters are dealt with explicitly in the dispositive instrument, the trans-
feror's actual intent may be a matter of pure conjecture. In addition, the
statutory scheme may totally frustrate the effectuation of the transferor's
planning objectives.' 21
CONCLUSION
The disclaimer is a useful estate planning vehicle. Its use lessens the
premium on skillful advance planning and enables taxpayers to adjust
transfers in light of emerging circumstances which could not have been
foreseen prior to the transfer. Congress should facilitate the use of the dis-
portion" must be expressed in terms of all the income from a fraction or percentage and that
the gill of a fixed amount of income would not suffice.
"6 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 191A,* 7 (1975).
"17 The Massachusetts statute provides that the disclaimed interest shall pass in the same
manner as if the disclaimant had died immediately preceding the event determining that he is
the beneficiary and that such interest is indefeasibly vested. It also provides that the "interest
in property being disclaimed shall never vest in the beneficiary." It does not explicitly treat the
issue of the impact of the disclaimer upon other interests in the property, such as future
interests. Id.
"" See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c) (5th ed., Official 1977 Text).
" 9 1d, at Comment.
"° Id.
I" For a discussion of acceleration,- see W. SCHWARTZ, FUTURE INTERESTS & ESTATE
PLANNING §§ 1 1.5-11.9 (1977 Supp.).
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claimer by enacting legislation which corrects the deficiencies, gaps, and
ambiguities in section 2518. In particular, section 2518 should be revised to
meet the problems discussed in this article relating to partial disclaimers,
partial disclaimers and the marital deduction, powers, and the procedural
rules governing disclaimers.
The ameliorative legislation should preempt local law on the subject
of disclaimers. A federal tax result should not be dependent upon the vag-
aries and technicalities of local law. Such a federally oriented approach
would promote uniformity. Taxpayers who reside in different states should
not be treated differently under the federal tax law.
Although the attainment of these goals may require more detailed,
comprehensive legislation, this should not prove to be an insuperable bar-
rier to change. As the present form of section 2518 indicates, brevity is no
virtue in this field. It is true that the resulting federal law may differ con-
siderably from a state's disclaimer rules and that the taxpayer will be con-
fronted with the obligation to satisfy the requisites of two different
regimes—the federal rules of disclaimer relating to federal tax law and the
state law of disclaimer pertaining to the transmission of property and local
taxation. This problem can be rectified, however, more readily and ex-
peditiously by the states falling into line and adopting the federal dis-
claimer model. This course of action would not unduly interfere with or
disrupt the development of local law consistent with local needs. The fed-
eral disclaimer statute, in essence, only affects one small segment of local
property law. It permits a person, who never derived any beneficial enjoy-
ment from property, to redirect promptly the title to another. It is consis-
tent with the basic philosophy that a person shouldn't be required to accept
title to property he does not want.
Finally, a potential loss of revenues is not a solid reason for erecting
barriers to disclaimers. The size of the governmental treasury should not
be dependent upon 20-20 foresight or the gift of prophecy.
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